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ABSTRACT 
This Article focuses on militarization and weaponization of space. Though there are no authoritative international 
definitions of either term, the former refers to ‘the use of outer space by a significant number of military spacecraft’, 
while the latter ‘refers to the placing in outer space for any length of time any device designed to attack man-made 
targets in outer space and/or in the terrestrial environment.’ Militarization of space occurred many decades ago. The 
contemporary concern is weaponization of space; that is, the introduction of new futuristic weapons into the space 
environment. The Article argues that the quantum leaps by China’s space program (set to outpace Russia’s cash 
strapped program) may herald the dawn of a new Cold War and a heated arms race with the United States as China 
seeks to underwrite its regional pre-eminence with military might. The Article highlights the fact that the 
international Space Law regime now has a new game in the making for which it is in many ways ill equipped to 
handle. 
 
 
We will engage terrestrial targets someday—ships, airplanes, land targets—from space. We will engage targets in 
space, from space. … [The] missions are already assigned, and we’ve written the concepts of operations.1  
General Joseph W Ashy, USAF (1996) 
 
[I]f there was ever a threat to our national security [in space], the best—the only—way to solve the problem is to 
take weapons into space.2  
General Howell M Estes, III USAF (1997) 
 
The Pentagon is so sure that whomever controls space will control the Earth and beyond that they are feverishly 
working to deploy anti-satellite weapons (ASATs) that will enable the US to knock out competitors’ ‘eyes in the sky’ 
during any future hostilities. As the Space Command says in its slick Vision for 2020 brochure, ‘Control of space is 
the ability to assure access to space, freedom of operations within the space medium, and an ability to deny others 
the use of space if required.’3  
Bruce K Gagnon (1999) 
 
                                                 
* LLB (Hons) (Moi), LLM (Hons) (Cantab), PhD (Melb), GCertPPT (UoN). Senior Lecturer in Law, University of 
Newcastle (Australia). The author wishes to acknowledge the enlightening comments and suggestions of two 
anonymous referees which contributed to the strengthening of the substantive flow and structure of this Article. Any 
errors however remain the author’s.  
1 Quoted in William B Scott, ‘Pentagon Considers Space as New Area of Responsibility’ (1997) 146(12) Aviation 
Week and Space Technology 54, 55.
2 Ibid. 
3 Bruce K Gagnon, ‘Pyramids to the Heavens: The Coming Battle for Control and Exploitation of Space’ (1999) 48 
Toward Freedom 1, available at <http://www.towardfreedom.com> at 10 December 2005.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The mastery of outer space as the basis of integrated battleground platforms4 is fast becoming a 
reality. As the two Gulf Wars and the Kosovo military campaign made clear, space assets are 
decisive in battle planning and execution. The contemporary move towards weaponization of 
space and its intersection with international law forms the basis of this article. Given the 
increasing global reliance on space systems, and increasing militarization of space, its 
weaponization and evolution into a distinct theatre of military operations seems likely.5 With the 
dawn of the 21st century, the prospect of a celestial war is no idle scenario. Space warfare is the 
focus of serious planning as the military planners of major powers brace for new forms of high-
tech combat. The notion of space warfare has moved from pure science fiction, created in 
Hollywood, to realistic planning.6 Though armed conflicts have not occurred in space to date, the 
rudimentary means for engaging in such conflicts now exist. This is particularly evident in the 
US where the Air Force has recently increased its focus on space—not just how to operate there, 
but how to protect operations and attack others in space.7 It has established a new ‘space 
operations directorate’ at Air Force Headquarters, opened a new Space Warfare School and 
activated two new units: the 76th Space Control Squadron and the 527th Space Aggressor 
Squadron.8  
                                                 
4 This concept encapsulates the combination of land, sea and air forces through the use of space assets notably 
satellite capabilities to enhance the co-ordination of manpower and facilitation of synergies of firepower. This 
includes centralisation of the gathering and processing of intelligence (tracking and identifying military objectives 
including troop movements), transmission and dissemination of orders from central command centres to the war 
theatre and vice versa and use of Global Positioning Satellites (GPS) to facilitate troop movements and mark targets. 
5 See United States Space Command, Vision for 2020 (1997) Federation of American Scientists 
<http://fas.org.spp/military/docops/usspac/visbook.pdf> at 15 November 2005. 
6 Thomas E Ricks, ‘Space is Playing Field for Newest War Game: Air Force Exercise Shows Shift in Focus’, 
Washington Post, 29 January 2001, A01, available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A58813-
2001Jan28> at 10 October 2005. 
7  Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
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Many may regard combat in space as an extension of air to air ‘dog-fighting’, but the 
velocities involved and the nature of the battlefield itself suggest a different set of dynamics. 
Major Robert A Ramsey suggests that space combat ought to be viewed sui generis as 
fundamentally different from combat in terrestrial airspace, based on the reality that air combat 
and space combat ‘are fundamentally different types of combat suggesting different doctrinal 
tenets of power’.9 He astutely notes: ‘freed from a strict air warfare paradigm, the effort to 
establish limits on space combat in its own right can draw principles of armed conflict from those 
applicable to land and sea warfare, as well as from those governing air warfare’.10 This author 
concurs with Ramsey’s conclusion that, ‘[w]hile the military use of space has traditionally been 
viewed as a medium from which to support terrestrial warfare, including air warfare, space as a 
medium of warfare itself raises entirely different legal and operational issues’.11 Considering the 
spatial separation of human combatants from their weaponry and the legal analysis of issues 
unique to space combat, it is asserted here that space warfare is indeed a stand-alone field of 
combat that is not adequately captured by the international regime on the use of force.  
At the heart of this Article lies the theme of militarization and weaponization of space. 
Though there are no authoritative international definitions of either term, the former refers to ‘the 
use of outer space by a significant number of military spacecraft’, while the latter ‘refers to the 
placing in outer space for any length of time any device designed to attack man-made targets in 
outer space and/or in the terrestrial environment.’12 Militarization of space occurred many 
                                                 
9 Robert A Ramey, ‘Armed Conflict on the Final Frontier: The Law of War in Space’ (2000) 48 Air Force Law 
Review 1, 2.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ivan A Vlasic, ‘Space Law and the Military Applications of Space Technology’ in Nandasiri Jasentuliyana (ed) 
Perspectives on International Law (1995) 386, n 6. 
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decades ago.13 The contemporary concern is weaponization of space; that is, the introduction of 
weapons into the space environment. This Article seeks to highlight the fact that the international 
space law regime14 now has a new game in the making for which it is in many ways ill equipped 
to handle.  
In Part II the Article discusses the trends towards an arms race in space, noting the 
various technological and engineering endeavours geared to this goal. It analyses the efforts 
towards militarization and weaponization of outer space in the shadow of international efforts to 
push for an exclusive use of outer space for peaceful purposes. It notes the antagonistic domestic 
policies (particularly by the United States) to recognise the utility of space within its broad self-
defence concept. Part III focuses on a discussion of the space regime. It adopts a two-prong 
analysis on one hand elaborating the entrenchment of international legal instruments to govern 
outer space, and exposing their inadequacies and limitations in respect of the weaponization of 
space. On the other hand, it carries out a tour de horizon of the efforts of various specialist UN 
committees and conferences to secure a consensus to halt weaponization of outer space.  
Part IV of the Article notes the maturation of a space enabled integrated battle platform 
manifest in the first Gulf War and the paradox of the 1990s—a decade in which significant 
technological breakthroughs brought weaponization of the space to the fore and witnessed United 
                                                 
13 From the initial conquest of space, both the US and the Soviet Union used space for such military purposes such as 
early warning and monitoring of arms control agreements and military reconnaissance.
14 The space regime as it now exists rests upon five multilateral United Nations treaties on outer space: Treaty on 
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space in the Exploration and Use 
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature 27 January 1967, 610 UNTS 
205 (entered into force 10 October 1967); Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the 
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature 22 April 1968, 672 UNTS 119 (entered into 
force 3 December 1968); Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, opened for 
signature 29 March 1972, 961 UNTS 187 (entered into force 1 September 1972); Convention on Registration of 
Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature 14 January 1975, 1023 UNTS 15 (entered into force 15 
September 1979); and Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened 
for signature 5 December 1979, [1986] ATS 14, annexed to GA Res 34/68, UN GAOR, 34th sess, UN Doc A/34/664 
(1979) (entered into force 11 July 1984). These treaties evolved from a series of General Assembly resolutions and 
declarations following the creation of the Outer Space Committee in 1959.
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States initiatives to deploy missile defence. Ironically the same decade witnessed robust 
initiatives by the two dominant space-powers to limit strategic offensive weaponry through the 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I & II).  Part VI of the Article argues that the 
quantum leaps by China’s space program may herald the dawn of a new Cold War and a heated 
arms race with the United States as China seeks to underwrite its regional pre-eminence with 
military might. To be a regional hegemony China needs to dominate its own backyard, something 
that is leading the United States to increasing seek to contain rather than engage China. Part VII 
rounds off the discussion and analysis by casting an eye on the ambivalence of national and 
international initiatives and what the future may portend and how existing initiatives may anchor 
the mantra of peaceful purposes and curtail the weaponization outer space. 
 
II. THE COLD WAR—A DIFFERENT WAR: NEW IMPERIAL MILITARY 
AMBITIONS 
The contemporary technological arms race underpinned by strategic offensive weaponry15 
commenced in the shadow of World War II with the wartime effort to design and build the first 
nuclear weapons. With the discovery of fission in 1939, it became clear to scientists that certain 
radioactive materials could be used to make a bomb of unprecedented power.16 On 9 October 
1941, then United States President Franklin Roosevelt formally authorised atomic weapon 
development,17 heralding the modern development of strategic weaponry. The Manhattan Project 
(as the project is popularly known) represented a massive and outstandingly successful 
                                                 
15 In the context of this Article, it means weaponry that has unprecedented power and reach in comparison to 
conventional weaponry and is geared to generate massive firepower attacks aimed at the destruction of an array of 
infrastructure such as electric power grids, telecommunications, and transportation geared to not only undermine the 
opponent’s economic and military capacity but also neutralise its ability to sustain or mount counter-attacks.  
Strategic weaponry addresses the deficiencies of first generation modern war dominated by man and fire power. 
Strategic weaponry makes use of technology and engineering breakthroughs to deliver awesome massed firepower in 
every hit. See eg Thomas X Hammes, ‘Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation’ (2005) 214 
Strategic Forum 1, available at <http://www.ndu.edu/inss> at 10 February 2006. 
16 The Manhattan Project (2006) Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manhattan_Project> at 10 February 2006. 
17 This was incidentally two months before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, on 7 December 1941. 
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technological effort.18 After surmounting many scientific, coordination and political problems, 
the first ever nuclear test signalling the start of the Atomic Age took place on 16 July 1945.19 A 
few weeks later the power of the atomic bomb was unleashed by America on Japan targeting two 
of its key cities—Hiroshima and Nagasaki.20
Modern strategic arms limitation efforts generally date back to the aftermath of the 
Japanese atomic bombings. In light of the overwhelming destructive potential of nuclear weapons 
it was apparent that these weapons caused a threat to humanity and in the event of a nuclear war, 
the very survival of humanity. In 1946 the then American representative to the newly formed 
United Nations (UN), Bernard Baruch, proposed that nuclear weapons be eliminated.21 In 
response, the UN General Assembly set up the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to make 
proposals for the peaceful uses of atomic energy and for the elimination of weapons of mass 
destruction.  
The Commission concentrated debate on the Baruch Plan for an international agency to 
control atomic power and weapons but the plan was vetoed by the Soviet Union in the Security 
Council. The Soviets refusal of this proposition was primarily due to its ongoing efforts to bridge 
the technological gap created by the United States’ Manhattan Project. The net result was that the 
Commission languished in an impasse for another three years. In 1949, the Soviet Union joined 
the nuclear club. With several other major powers accelerating their efforts to develop atomic 
bombs, the possible proliferation of nuclear weapons generated sufficient concern helping break 
                                                 
18 The Manhattan Project, above n 16. 
19 The nuclear test took place in New Mexico. It was a test of an implosion–design plutonium bomb, the same type 
later dropped on Japan a few weeks later. 
20 Hiroshima was a major industrial and Nagasaki was its largest port. The bombings left tens of thousands dead in 
the aftermath and hundreds of thousands injured then or thereafter. 
21 Cold War: Arms Race (Undated) Prince of Wales Collegiate 
<http://www.pwc.k12.nf.ca/coldwar/plain/armsrace.html> at 10 January 2006. 
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the impasse at the AEC. This led to several initiatives aimed at limiting various aspects of nuclear 
weaponry.22
Amidst the initiatives to curtail nuclear proliferation, in October 1954, the Committee for 
the International Geophysical Year (IGY) recommended that its member countries should 
consider launching artificial satellites for scientific space exploration. Emphasis was placed on 
satellites to measure the characteristics of the unknown space environment with scientists seeking 
to lay foundations for satellites to serve different purposes including communication, weather and 
navigation. These calls provided an enormous stimulus for further research on artificial satellites 
by the United States and the Soviet Union.  
Three years later, the Soviet Union brought the Space Age to life with the launch of 
Sputnik 1, the first artificial satellite.23 Despite the overarching principle of the use of outer space 
for peaceful purposes, the military advantages offered by outer space were hard to resist once the 
United States and Soviet Union had succeeded in placing satellites in orbit. Though the earliest 
satellite programs focused on communications, weather intelligence and navigation aid; almost 
simultaneously and indeed as an outgrowth both the United States and Soviet Union began 
exploring missile warning systems to monitor the launch of Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles 
(ICBMs).24 It was not lost on the two space faring powers that space assets would in the near 
future be indispensable to combat operations.25 The international community was quick to note 
this changing mindset and generated rhetoric that states should use outer space for positive and 
peaceful purposes in an effort to ensure a pro-active rather than the reactive stance which had 
dominated atomic weaponry.  
                                                 
22 The first productive treaty to come out of this committee came in 1957 with the signing by the US and Russia of 
an agreement to demilitarise Antarctica and to ban testing of nuclear devices there. 
23 On 31 January 1958 the United States of America joined the Space Age with the Launch of Explorer 1. 
24 Curtis Peebles, High Frontier: The US Air Force and the Military Space Program (1997) 33.
25 Ramey, above n 9 at 16–17. 
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In 1957 the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 1148 dealing with the topic of 
disarmament which declared that ‘the sending of objects through outer space shall be exclusively 
for peaceful and scientific purposes.’26 In the following year, UN General Assembly Resolution 
1348 recognised that the common aim of humankind was that outer space was to be used ‘for 
peaceful purposes only.’27 The United States and Soviet Union obliged with the United States 
adopting the view that ‘“peaceful” in relation to outer space activities was interpreted…to mean 
“non-aggressive” rather than non-military… By contrast, the Soviet Union publicly took the 
view, despite its own military uses of space, that “peaceful” meant “non-military” and that in 
consequence all military activities in outer space were “non-peaceful” and possibly illegal.’28
Leading by example, the United States passed the National Aeronautics and Space Act in 
1958.29 In line with general international sentiment on the necessity of the use of space for 
‘peaceful purposes’, the Act asserted that ‘activities in space should be devoted to peaceful 
purposes for the benefit of all mankind’.30 The Act established the ‘foundation for United States 
policy in the development of international space law and serve[d] as a parallel to the international 
policies established through the United Nations’.31 Although Congress adopted the ‘peaceful 
purposes for the benefit of all mankind’ standard for space activities and placed these activities 
under the auspices of NASA, Congress also carved out a national defence exception to handle 
certain military activities.32
                                                 
26 Regulation, Limitation and Blanced Reduction of All Armed Forces and All Armaments; Conclusion of an 
International Convention (Treaty) on the Reduction of Armaments and the Prohibition of Atomic, Hydrogen and 
Other Weapons of Mass Destruction, GA Res 1148, UN GAOR, 12  sess, UN Doc A/3805 (1957).th
27 Ivan A Vlasic, ‘The Legal Aspects of Peaceful and Non–Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ in Bhupendra Jasani (ed)., 
Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Uses of Space, Problems of Definition for the Prevention of an Arms Race  (1991) 39.
28 Ibid 40.
29 National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, 42 USC § 2451(a) (1994).
30 Ibid. 
31 S Neil Hosenball and Richard Reeves, ‘A Preface to US Space Laws and Policies’ in S Gorove (ed), US Space 
Law (1983) vol 1, 17, 20–21. 
32 National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, 42 USC § 2451 (1994). The exception, section 102(b), is seemingly 
at odds with the spirit of the “peaceful purposes” clause of section 102(a). Section 102(b) states that:  
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In 1961, with a quantum leap in space technology, humankind’s determination to reach 
the heavens came to fruition when the Soviet Union launched the first manned spaceflight, 
placing Yuri Gagarin into orbit. The United States followed suit in 1962. This marked the start of 
a technological space race between the United States and the Soviet Union with each seeking to 
assert dominance in space exploration providing the genesis of a competition which would soon 
metamorphose into an arms race. The history of the militarization and weaponization of space 
goes back to this period.  
In the 1960s several air-launched Anti-Satellite Weapons (ASAT) systems were tested by 
the United States and Soviet Union as a counter weight to each other’s development of strategic 
air-launched and satellite-dependent ballistic missiles. Early experiments focused on ‘hard-kill 
weapons’ involving experimentation in kinetic energy weapons—a form of hypervelocity 
weapon.33 In the same period, study also commenced on laser weapons—Directed Energy 
Weapons capable of disabling satellites.34 It was clear, at least theoretically then that lasers and 
ASATs with the capability to target space assets stood to radically change warfare if ever 
fielded.35 The research was to span many decades with tremendous technical problems being 
gradually resolved.  
                                                                                                                                                              
 
[A]ctivities peculiar to or primarily associated with the development of weapons systems, military 
operations, or the defense of the United States (including the research and development necessary to make 
effective provision for the defense of the United States) shall be the responsibility of, and shall be directed 
by, the Department of Defense. 
 
33 The most common version of this was the ASAT designed for use against artificial satellites. These are ‘hard kill’ 
weapons that shatter their target through high-speed impact owing to the tremendous speeds at which these objects 
travel in orbit in low-earth orbit which generate kinetic energy sufficient to obliterate targets: Vlasic, above n 12, 
397–8. 
34 ‘Laser’ is an acronym for Light Amplification by Stimulated Emission of Radiation, a device that produces a 
narrow beam of radiation by means of a physical emission. The intense beams can be used to either physically harm 
the satellite or simply to ‘blind’ the satellite sensors.  For a concise discussion, see Major William Spacy II, Does the 
United States Need Space–Based Weapons? (1999) Maxwell–Gunter Air Force Base 
<http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/CADRE_Papers/PDF_Bin/spacy.pdf> at 23 October 2005, 10. 
35 Ramey, above n 9, 23, 25.  
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The international community continued to maintain the view that outer space should be 
used for ‘peaceful’ purposes. However, the disagreement was whether this meant ‘non-military’ 
or ‘non-aggressive uses’, especially considering the fact that the then dominant players—the two 
superpowers—were actively engaged in harnessing the military utility offered by space and were 
thus averse to a strict definition. While talk of ‘peace’ increased, so did the military potential of 
space technology. With this in mind, the United States’ interpretation of the word ‘peaceful’ was 
created.36 The official position of the United States has been and still remains that ‘peaceful’ 
means ‘non-aggressive’ and not ‘non-military’.37 The Soviet Union held an opposite view that 
military activities in the space environment cannot be and are not peaceful.38 The Soviet 
proposal, banning the use of outer space for military purposes, equated peaceful use with non-
military use.39 While both the United States and the Soviet Union continued to defend their 
positions, the truth of the matter was that neither country wanted a final definition to be accepted 
by all states.40 Such an ultimate conclusion would limit both countries’ future use of outer 
space.41
As the Cold War confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union heated up, 
the military utility space offered continued to fuel intense research and development of state-of-
the-art technology to capitalise on the military utility of outer space. By the 1970s, the Soviet 
Union had succeeded in developing an explosive kill vehicle with the ability to be ‘hoisted’ into 
the same orbital plane as a target satellite. In addition, development of electromagnetic and 
                                                 
36 See Bin Cheng, Studies in International Space Law (1997) 515. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Carl Christol, The Modern International Law of Outer Space (1982) 22. 
39 See Cheng, above n 36, at 515. 
40 Ibid 516. 
41 As Menon states, ‘[s]ince an all-pervasive, acceptable, objective criteria defining peaceful uses have never been 
devised, the conclusion that a particular activity is peaceful is always a subjective determination and therefore apt to 
reflect the self interests of the party making the determination’: P K Menon, The United Nations’ Efforts to Outlaw 
the Arms Race in Outer Space (1988) Chapter 3. 
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radiation weapons with the capacity to impair electronic circuitry by the creation and/or emission 
of electromagnetic pulse (EMP) was actively underway and yielding exciting results. 
Technological breakthroughs were turning scientific dreams into military utility.42 The US on the 
other hand was experimenting with ‘Microsats’—small non-kinetic devices borne on a Space 
Operated Vehicle (SOV) that could be used to disable or disrupt rather than to destroy enemy 
satellites when released in outer space. Military planners were soon diversifying their vision to 
encompass development of military space plane technologies and a viable military space plane 
base.43
In 1978, in an effort to clarify policy for space activities in light of technological 
advances, the Carter administration ordered the National Security Council Policy Review 
Committee to review existing space policy and develop guidelines for space activities.44 The 
resulting Presidential Directive provided that the United States would continue to advance the 
dual goals of international cooperation and national defence. On one hand, the principles 
championed peaceful uses of outer space, asserting the United States’ commitment to the 
exploration and use of outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes and the centrality of 
scientific and economic imperatives, while on the other asserting the utility of space as a 
component of its national defence.45 
                                                 
42 Christopher M Petras, ‘The Use Of Force In Response To Cyber-Attack On Commercial Space Systems—Re-
examining “Self-Defense” In Outer Space In Light Of The Convergence Of US Military And Commercial Space 
Activities’ (2002) 67 Journal of Air Law & Commerce 1213, 1224. 
43 These initiatives included Transatmospheric Vehicles (TAV), Military Aerospace Vehicles (MAV) and 
experimental reusable space planes. For details see Military Spaceplane (Undated) GlobalSecurity.org  
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/msp.htm> at 9 August 2005; Paul B Stares, The Militarization of 
Space: US Policy, 1945–1984 (1985) 169, 178–9. 
44 White House, ‘Description of Presidential Directive on National Space Policy’ (Press Release, 20 June 1978). 
45 Ibid. 
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In 1980, with Jimmy Carter out of office, Ronald Reagan became the new occupant of the 
White House. When Reagan came into office, détente was the policy of the day.46 Reagan 
abandoned détente and made no secret of the fact that he considered the Soviet Union to be an 
‘evil empire’. Under Reagan, a significant shift in space policy was to take place. In 1981, the 
first year of the Reagan presidency, the new administration initiated a comprehensive space 
policy review, geared towards exploring ways of generating a United States military capacity to 
weaponize space. On 23 March 1983, Reagan launched the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). 
The SDI was a system geared to use space-based systems to protect the US from attack by 
strategic nuclear missiles.  
The SDI provided a measure of legitimacy to many ideas that were formerly seen as 
impossible. An arms race in outer space now meant something more—the introduction of new, 
futuristic weapons, including beam, kinetic, electronic, and laser weapons, into the space 
environment. With the SDI in place and Reagan’s militaristic mindset, billions of dollars were 
splashed on various military projects, mainly innovative technologies to bolster the military 
might of the United States. Instead of cooperating with the Soviets, Reagan was dedicated to 
strengthening US military might and also determined to force the Soviets to match America’s 
massive military budget. The initiative aimed at developing and introducing futuristic weapons 
into the space environment to assert United States military and technological supremacy over the 
Soviet Union.  
There was considerable debate over the necessity, feasibility, and cost-effectiveness of the 
weapons envisaged under the SDI. Nevertheless, the huge military expenditure did finally pay 
                                                 
46 Détente is French for relaxation. Generally, it may be applied to any international situation where previously 
hostile nations not involved in an open war ‘warm up’ to each other and threats de-escalate. However, today in 
international parlance, it has come primarily to refer to a general reduction in the tension between the Soviet Union 
and the United States and a weakening of the Cold War, occurring from the late until the start of the 1980s: Détente 
(2005) Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Detente> at 26 September 2005. 
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dividends. Among its major successes was the flight on 13 September 1985 by United States Air 
Force pilot Major Doug Pearson. He made military history when he successfully displayed the 
capabilities of ASAT weapons. Flying an F-15A at one and half times the speed of sound, he 
launched a missile which kinetically destroyed a practice target satellite, reducing to it space 
debris.47 Pearson’s feat provided credence to, as well as a propaganda base for, the Reagan 
administration’s ‘Star Wars’ vision, signalling a new phase in the arms race in outer space. The 
successful flight provided just the sort of evidence that proponents of the weaponization of space 
needed. It was evident that a robust, well-funded space program would be able to develop 
workable technologies. What had been regarded generally as science fiction four decades earlier 
was rapidly moving to the realm of military reality through the harnessing of technology and 
innovative engineering, buttressed by tens of millions of dollars in research and development 
funds. 
By 1989, the Reagan policy of ‘ASAT and EMP deterrence’, and the corresponding goal 
of developing and deploying an anti-satellite capability were reaffirmed and entrenched as part of 
US military policy with the introduction of National Space Policy Directive No 1 (NSPD 1) in 
1989. The Directive stated:  
 
The United States will conduct those activities in space that are necessary to national defense. Space 
activities will contribute to national security objectives by (1) deterring, or if necessary, defending against 
enemy attack; (2) assuring that forces of hostile nations cannot prevent our own use of space; (3) negating, 
if necessary, hostile space systems; and (4) enhancing operations of United States and Allied forces.  
 
 
 
                                                 
47 Michel Bourbonnière, ‘Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and the Neutralisation of Satellites or Ius in Bello 
Satellitis’ (2004) 9 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 43, 56. 
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III. THE SPACE LAW REGIME: A PATCHY FRAMEWORK AND LEAKY LEGAL 
PLATFORM? 
 
A. Steps Forward? Disciplining Space Endeavours through International Law 
As noted in Part II of the Article, in the early days of man’s ascent into space, the 
majority of the international community failed to agree on whether ‘peaceful’ meant ‘non-
military’. It was amidst this background of disagreement that the space resolution—the 
Declaration of Legal Principles Governing State Activity in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space (Declaration of Principles)—was adopted in late 1963 by the United Nations General 
Assembly.48 In many regards, it was the ‘first significant step in the development of space law’.49 
As Ramey notes, ‘[t]hough not binding on any State, the Resolution does not read like a 
traditional resolution. It declares and announces legal principles instead of merely recommending 
a course of action.’50  
In the same year that the Declaration on Legal Principles was adopted, the Treaty Banning 
Nuclear Weapons in the Atmosphere, In Outer Space and Under Water (Limited Test Ban Treaty) 
entered into force to address the contested and controversial issue of nuclear detonations in 
space.51 The Treaty primarily aimed to limit nuclear weapons testing but was also a reaction to 
Soviet pleas that nuclear detonations posed a danger to the safety of its cosmonauts. The US had 
responded to the Soviet concern with the assurance ‘that no activities were contemplated which 
could have harmful effects upon the Soviet spacemen’, however the international community felt 
                                                 
48 Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, GA 
Res 1962, UN GAOR, 18th sess, UN Doc A/5515 (1963). 
49 Ramey, above n 9. 
50 Ibid 67. 
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it imperative that nuclear detonations be totally banned.52 With the entry into force of the treaty, 
nuclear detonations in space were no longer lawful.  
The year 1967 also yielded a very significant treaty, the Treaty on Principles Governing 
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty).53 So prominent and significant is this treaty that it has 
often been referred to as ‘the constitution of outer space’.54 It represents ‘the primary basis for 
legal order in the space environment’55 and has been termed the ‘Magna Carta of outer space 
law’.56 The major principles governing activities in space are presented in articles 1, 2 and 3 of 
the Outer Space Treaty. Article 1 states that activities in outer space, including the moon and 
other celestial bodies, shall be conducted for the benefit of all countries and that outer space shall 
be part of the heritage of all mankind.57 It also provides for freedom of scientific investigation in 
outer space and for international cooperation in such investigation.58 Article 2 provides that 
nations cannot appropriate outer space by claim of sovereignty.59 Article 3 provides that states 
parties to the Treaty are to conduct their activities in space in accordance with international law, 
the United Nations Charter, and in the interest of international peace, security, cooperation and 
understanding.60  
Of significance with regard to the use of force is article 3’s reference to article 51 of the 
Charter of the United Nations and, particularly its express preservation of the right of states to 
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use space in self-defence. Though the UN Charter forbids the ‘threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Purposes of the United Nations’,61 the meaning of this prohibition remains hotly 
contested. As early as 1962, in an address to the UN General Assembly, then US Senator Al Gore 
proclaimed that the established rule of ‘peaceful purposes’ includes the right of a state to self-
defence.  
 
It is the view of the U.S. that outer space should be used only for peaceful—that is nonaggressive and 
beneficial—purposes. The question of military activities in space cannot be divorced from the question of 
military activities on earth. To banish these activities in both environments we must continue our efforts 
for general and complete disarmament with adequate safeguards. Until this is achieved, the test of any 
space activity must not be whether it is military or non-military, but whether or not it is consistent with the 
U.N. Charter and other obligations of law.62  
 
Whatever definition one gives to the concept of ‘self-defence’, the ultimate test of 
whether an action is legitimate self-defence is the approval of the UN Security Council rather 
than the opinion of each individual nation asserting such a right.63 However, it is significant that 
many of the military initiatives in space by the space-faring nations have failed to elicit robust 
condemnations, despite constant debate and proclamations by the United Nations cautioning 
against an arms-race up yonder. In light of the fact that neither the UN nor the vast majority of its 
member states have protested these unilateral efforts, it would seem that there is a tacit 
imprimatur of approval. Turning to article 4, it provides in part: 
 
The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for 
peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any 
type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of 
military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The 
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use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies 
shall also not be prohibited.64
 
It is arguable whether the use of the adjective ‘exclusively’ in the article has any 
meaningful purposes in view of the express approval that ‘[t]he use of military personnel for 
scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited’. The reality is that 
most civilian applications are dual use and readily lend themselves to military utility. Secondly, 
the use of the word ‘purpose’ in article 4 of the Outer Space Treaty ‘brings in the notions of both 
intent and of consequences; the activity must not be designed to terminate in some use of force 
contrary to international law.’65 There is no indication that the Outer Space Treaty’s drafters 
intended the term ‘purpose’ to have any ‘special meaning’. ‘Purpose’ is generally defined as ‘an 
intended or desired result; end, aim; goal’.66 By this reasoning, for example, the ‘Star Wars’ 
program which never came to fruition would be held to be a peaceful use as its stated purpose 
was to defend the US, a peaceful ‘purpose’. That would equally mean that the ‘Son of Star Wars’ 
program falls in this parameter. The problem persists since weapons that are placed for defensive 
purposes can just as easily have offensive utility. The big question then becomes ‘does the Outer 
Space Treaty incorporate a “rightful intent” test?’67  
Besides the Outer Space Treaty, another set of rules was developed in the early 1970s, 
when détente cooled down the heated arms race, opening a new window of opportunity for the 
superpowers. This led to the signing of two significant treaties—the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 
(ABM Treaty)68 and the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) Treaty.69 Both these 
                                                 
64 Outer Space Treaty, art 4. 
65 James E S Fawcett, Outer Space: New Challenges to Law and Policy (1984) 109. See also Morenoff, above n 63,  
296.
66 Random House College Dictionary (1980) 1074.
67 Fawcett, above n 65, 109.
68 Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-
Ballistic Missile Systems, signed 26 May 1972, 944 UNTS 13 (entered into force 3 October 1972) (‘ABM Treaty’). 
 17
treaties tacitly recognise the legality of reconnaissance satellites as a means of verifying treaty 
compliance, and prohibit any ‘interference’ with their function.70 The provisions are no surprise 
since consensus was that positive activities in space included, but were not limited to, the use of 
military satellites to monitor the performance of arms-control agreements. Two primary 
provisions of the ABM Treaty have a direct bearing on the weaponization of space — articles 5 
and 12.  
Article 5(1) provides that ‘[e]ach party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM 
systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based’.71 
Though there were no space-based ABM systems in existence in 1972 when the treaty was 
adopted, the space program of each Party was highly advanced and each could foresee the use of 
space-based ABM systems.72 Article 12 is perhaps even more significant to the long-term use of 
space by military systems beyond the narrower question of ABM systems:  
 
1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party 
shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally 
recognized principles of international law.  
2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other 
Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.73  
 
Paragraph 1 is significant. Though the legality of military surveillance activity from space 
was established in international law prior to the ABM Treaty, the treaty gave formal sanction to 
the practice by the two leading space-faring states. In particular, it acknowledged the legality of 
space-based surveillance via satellite and entrenched this as ‘an essential component of the 
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international arms control regime’.74 Thus, while the term ‘peaceful’ is contained in all UN 
documents devoted to outer space matters, Richard A Morgan notes that most experts agree that 
the Outer Space Treaty does not prohibit ‘military use’ of space.75 He goes on to note that there is 
a ‘consensus, within the United Nations that “peaceful” more specifically equates to “non-
aggressive”.’76 However, the problem of identifying the exact parameters and interpretation of 
the term ‘peaceful’ in regard to the space law regime, and hence the interpretation to be accorded 
to the ABM Treaty and SALT Treaty, still persists in view of the fact that the general stance by 
commentators is at odds with the Conference on Disarmament’s assertion in 1986 that ‘[n]o 
country should develop, test or deploy space weapons in any form’.77 Alex Meyer offers a robust 
defence of this position, noting:  
 
[a]ny use of space which does not itself constitute an attack upon, or stress against, the territorial integrity 
and independence of another State, would be ‘permissible.’ Military manoeuvres in peacetime, the issue of 
reconnaissance satellites, the testing of weapons, the establishment of military Orbiting Laboratories 
(MOLs), etc., would therefore be also permissible in Outer Space. These activities belong to the so-called 
‘peaceful military activities’.78  
 
From the foregoing discussion of the central treaties comprising the space law regime, it 
is readily apparent that despite the use for peaceful purposes centrepiece of the space law regime, 
key provisions readily lend themselves to interpretations that would support many aspects of 
militarization and weaponization of space. The matter is thus open and dependent on the 
perspective a state adopts, since the standard can be stretched and this elastic nature allows the 
space law regime to fit a ‘for and against’ interpretation. Supporters of the militarization theory 
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rely on a fundamental axiom of international law: ‘If an act is not specifically prohibited, then 
international law permits it’.79  Professor N M Matte sums up the patchy nature of the space law 
regime by noting that the regime, which includes the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Outer Space 
Treaty, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Moon Agreement, was developed to ‘permit, 
indeed to endorse, the arms race, including the militarization of space’.80  
 
B. Musical Chairs? UN Efforts to Build a Consensual Policy on Disarmament in Outer 
Space 
In the 1980s, in the face of the Reagan administration’s ambitious space militarization and 
weaponization vision, the United Nations was working to address the matter in a bid to head off 
the space arms race between the two superpowers. Ironically, it was the Soviet Union which 
introduced a robust plan to prevent an arms race in outer space into the agenda of the thirty-sixth 
General Assembly in the fall of 1981.81 It was a bold plan which proposed the conclusion of a 
Treaty on the Prohibition of the Stationing of Weapons of Any Kind in Outer Space.82 In 
response, the General Assembly expressed its view that it ‘considered it necessary to take 
effective steps, by concluding an appropriate international treaty, to prevent the spread of the 
arms race to outer space.’83 It also requested that the Conference on Disarmament begin 
negotiations to achieve agreement on the text of such a treaty.84 The following year, in its 
provisional agenda, the General Assembly reaffirmed its view that outer space ‘should be used 
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exclusively for peaceful purposes and that it should not become an arena for an arms race.’85 It 
went on to link peaceful uses of space with the good of general and complete disarmament.86  
In 1982, the United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space (UNISPACE 82) convened in Vienna, Austria.87 The Conference ‘was born out of a desire 
to explore how the worldwide activities in outer space, including international cooperation, could 
be developed to ensure that the potential benefits from space science, technology and their 
applications would be truly realized for all countries.’88 With regard to the military use of outer 
space, UNISPACE 82 came up with some tangible recommendations. However, its attempts to 
introduce language banning the testing and deployment of ASATs and guaranteeing the 
inviolability of all peaceful space activities failed.89 It did however reaffirm the goal of 
preventing an arms race in outer space and recommended that the United Nations bodies give 
priority to the issue of weapons in space. In relation to military use of outer space, the Conference 
made a number of recommendations key among which were:  
 
? The extension of an arms race into outer space is a matter of grave concern to the international community, 
detrimental to humanity and should be prevented.  
? The maintenance of peace and security in outer space is of great importance for international peace and 
security and the prevention of an arms race and hostilities in outer space is essential.90  
 
In its report issued at the end of its 1985 session, the United Nations Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) acknowledged the differing viewpoints by member 
states as to the extent to which the Committee could engage in substantive work toward the 
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peaceful maintenance of outer space.91 Some delegations wanted COPUOS to consider specific 
steps to ensure that the uses of space remained peaceful.92 Three years later, in 1988 the General 
Assembly passed a resolution supporting general and complete disarmament under effective 
international control.93 Resolution 43/70 stated that in order for disarmament to take place, outer 
space must be used for peaceful purposes and must not become an arena for a new arms race.94 
‘The General Assembly recognized the need to consolidate, reinforce, and enhance the legal 
regime in outer space, and to provide effective verification measures. The vote on the resolution 
was 154 to 1: the United States cast the single negative vote.’95  
In 1989, the prevention of an arms race in outer space was once again at the heart of the 
deliberations of the Conference on Disarmament composed of both developed and developing 
world countries when it convened for its 520th plenary meeting. Delegates called for the 
prevention of an arms race in outer space. The general sentiments of the meeting are captured in 
Indian Ambassador Sharma’s declaration that: 
 
[I]t is accepted that an extension of the arms race into outer space would have profoundly destabilizing 
consequences. Deeply conscious of such risks, an overwhelming majority of the Member States of the 
United Nations have in recent years urged the Conference on Disarmament to take resolute measures 
aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space.96  
 
However the differing viewpoints among some members and the political shadow cast by 
the reluctant superpowers prevented any definitive agenda emerging in relation to preventing 
weaponization of outer space, something which may perhaps have put a brake on the Reagan 
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administration's ‘Star Wars’ vision and thrown cold water on Soviet determination to match and 
counter the Reagan administration’s ambitious program.  
In 1990, in the face of an ascendant and bellicose United States the UN General Assembly 
felt obliged to identify the legal deficit in the Space Law regime with regard to militarization and 
weaponization of the Space environment. The General Assembly stated that, ‘[T]he legal regime 
applicable to outer space by itself does not guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer 
space, that this legal regime plays a significant role in the prevention of an arms race in that 
environment, [and expressed] the need to consolidate and reinforce that regime, ... enhance its 
effectiveness, and [emphasized] the importance of strict compliance with existing agreements, 
both bilateral and multilateral.’97 In addition, the General Assembly recognised the fact that 
statements were not sufficient to prevent an arms race and emphasised additional measures ‘with 
appropriate and effective provisions for verification to prevent an arms race in outer space’ must 
be adopted by the community of nations.98  The resolution called upon the major space faring 
states to ‘contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space’ and to ‘take 
immediate measures to prevent an arms race in outer space.’99
Despite the rhetoric at the United Nations, the move by the United States to ensure 
effective global power projection through space supremacy received added urgency in the same 
year when the first Gulf War broke out. The war demonstrated technically and militarily the 
multiplier effects that space technology would have on military capabilities.  
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V. THE GULF WAR—A WATERSHED: INTEGRATED BATTLE PLATFORMS COME 
OF AGE 
The first Gulf War was the first war to rely heavily on space technology and the first to 
demonstrate that an integrated battle platform, coordinated through space assets, would contribute 
tremendously to battleground supremacy. The war demonstrated that, ‘[a]s with other military 
operations, space operations [were] shedding the old strategic Cold War myopia and focusing 
instead on theatre war.’100 The experience of the first Gulf War, in which the multinational force 
suffered light casualties despite facing a supposedly battle-hardened Iraqi Army, and the role that 
technology played in enabling the multinational force to control the battlefield (despite facing 
being vastly outnumbered by the Iraqi army) buoyed US determination to enhance its military 
capabilities through technology. The heavy reliance on space technology convinced the US 
military that space dominance and space control were necessary. B K Gagnon sums up the 
technologically-driven and dominated first Gulf War thus: 
 
[T]he war was essentially an opportunity to test new weapons systems. Afterward, Pentagon 
spokespersons predicted that if other enemies could be prevented from gaining access to military space 
assets, the US could dominate any battlefield situation. An urgent call went out for anti-satellite weapons 
that could knock out competitors’ eyes and ears. Less than a decade later, the war in Kosovo was used to 
show the world that the goal [had] been achieved.101  
 
Speaking on the experience and lessons of the first Gulf War, General Colin Powell, then 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted that the United States ought to ‘achieve total control 
of space if [it is] to succeed on the modern battlefield.’102 On 19 June 1992, space was finally 
proposed to be included in the United States Air Force mission statement.103  About two years 
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later, in April 1994, General Horner, the Commander in Chief of US Space Command 
(USSPACECOM), testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, asserted that theatre 
missile defence was the United States’ ‘top priority’.104 The net result in subsequent years was to 
spur the United States to aggressively pursue research and development of innovative space 
weapons. In particular, the United States pursued research into the development of Space 
Operated Vehicles (SOVs) with the capability of delivering and deploying ordnances from space 
through low-earth orbit (LEO), geo-synchronous orbit (GEO) or sun-synchronous orbit (SSO). 
Since then, under the direction of the United States National Command Authority (NCA), the US 
has directed the use of military power through new force projection systems to strike targets in 
other countries during Operations Other Than War (OOTW).105  
Technological breakthroughs in the 1990s brought to the fore the fact that the heavens 
would not only be conquered but ruled. While the Clinton administration had advocated a robust 
space policy, the administration was disinclined towards heavy military spending on the 
initiatives. In 2001, Clinton exited the White House and George Bush Jr. took over the reins. The 
White House now had another bellicose, hard-line Republican occupant who, like Reagan in the 
1980s, was convinced that America’s pre-eminent status as a superpower must be underwritten 
by military might.  This entailed a need to not only maintain America’s supremacy but to eclipse 
every other nation. Shrugging the protests of the international community, the Bush Jr. 
administration dusted off Reagan’s SDI and brought it back to play with the embrace of the so-
called ‘Son of Star Wars’. Tens of millions of dollars were soon being pumped into new defence 
initiatives. This huge expenditure was buoyed further by a January 2001 report to Congress by 
                                                                                                                                                              
States Air Force, as cited in Suzanne B Gehri, ‘The Air Force Mission (Singular)’ (1992) 6(4) Airpower Journal 17, 
18. 
104 Charles A Horner, ‘Space Systems Pivotal to Modern Warfare’ (1994) 4 Defense 22, 24. 
105 Phillip Pournelle, Component Based Simulation of the Space Operations Vehicle and the Common Aero Vehicle 
(M Op Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1999) available at <http:// 
diana.gl.nps.navy.mil/~ahbuss/StudentTheses/PournelleThesis.pdf> at 31 March 2005.
 25
the Commission to Assess US National Security Space Management and Organization, chaired 
by Donald Rumsfeld (Rumsfeld Commission). 
In its report, the Commission warned that the 600 satellites upon which the US military 
depends for photo reconnaissance, targeting, communications, weather forecasting, early warning 
and intelligence gathering were highly vulnerable to attack from adversaries.106 The report went 
on to warn that the US must anticipate what Pentagon officials called a ‘Space Pearl Harbour’—a 
crippling sneak attack against American satellites orbiting the planet.107 To reduce the nation’s 
vulnerability, the Rumsfeld Commission urged the US to develop ‘superior space capabilities’, 
including the ability to ‘negate the hostile use of space against US interests’ by using ‘power 
projection in, from and through space’.108  Rumsfield noted that in history every medium—air, 
land and sea—had seen conflict. In essence, contemporary reality indicates that space will be no 
different. The report from his Commission rounded off by calling space warfare ‘a virtual 
certainty’.109  
 
The Other Side of the Coin: Redemption with Sin—Arms (Un)limitation 
In the 1990s, two key treaties (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I & II—START I & 
START II) were negotiated between the United States and Russia to serve aimed at reducing the 
United States’ and Russia’s stockpiles of nuclear arsenals. Although the ABM Treaty set out 
initial limitations on the use of strategic arms, START I was the first treaty to actually reduce the 
number of strategic offensive weapons, resulting in overall reductions of thirty to forty percent.110 
                                                 
106 Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization (2001) 
US Department of Defense <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/space20010111.html> at 28 March 2006. 
107 Ibid.  
108 Ibid.  
109 Ibid. 
110 Bureau of Arms Control, START Treaty Final Reductions Fact Sheet (2001) US Department of State 
<http://www.state.gov/t/ac/rls/fs/2001/index.cfm?docid=6669> at 28 March 2006. 
 26
START I brought about a reduction in both the United States’ and Russia’s nuclear warheads 
arsenal.111 United States President George H W Bush Sr. and Soviet Union President Mikhail 
Gorbachev signed the START I Treaty in Moscow in July of 1991.112 It was ratified by both 
countries in December 1994. 113  
As the START I Treaty was coming into force, negotiations were being finalised for the 
START II Treaty. The START II Treaty was designed to reduce the United States and Russian 
arsenal of strategic nuclear warheads and eliminate the most destabilising strategic weapons: 
heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and all other multiple-warhead ICBMs. This 
treaty was geared to build upon the START I Treaty and have greater reductions in strategic 
nuclear forces.114 Although the START II Treaty was designed to build upon the START I 
Treaty, it was never legally enacted and thus never gained legal binding force.115  
The United States approved the initial START II Treaty in 1996,116 but the Russian Duma 
refused to ratify it.117 Russian officials then attempted to amend the START II Treaty in 1997.118 
The Protocol to the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms 
included a memorandum of understanding linking ratification of the START II Treaty to the 
United States’ continued adherence to the ABM Treaty. On 4 May 2000, Russia ratified the 
                                                 
111 Secretary of State Colin L Powell, Statement on the Achievement of the Final Reductions under the START Treaty 
(5 December 2001) US Department of State 
<http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2001/dec/6674.htm> at 28 March 2006. 
112 Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, opened for signature 31 July  1991, US–
USSR (entered into force 5 December 1994) (‘START I’). 
113 Ibid. 
114 Comprehensive Nuclear Test–Ban Treaty, opened for signature 24 September 1996 (not yet in force). 
115 See Charles Digges, Russia and America Formally Scrap START II, ABM Treaty (2002) Bellona 
<http://www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/nuke-weapons/start/24686.html> at 15 July 2005. 
116 Baker Spring, Accept No Russian Conditions to START II Treaty (1998) The Heritage Foundation 
<http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/em561.cfm> at 28 March 2006. 
117 Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Background Note: Russia (2001) US Department of State 
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/bgn/index.cfm?docid=3183> at 11 June 2005. 
118 Ibid. 
 27
START II Treaty along with the 1997 Protocol; however, the United States never ratified the 
Treaty because it did not approve of the 1997 Protocol.119  
As START negotiations dominated United States and Russian foreign military policy, the 
United States Congress was dominated by activity concerning the ABM Treaty—ironically its 
termination rather than strengthening. The Patriot batteries deployed during the Persian Gulf War 
helped make a case for the role of Theatre Missile Defence (TMD).120 The duel between United 
States Patriot missile batteries and Iraqi SCUD theatre ballistic missiles during the 1991 Persian 
Gulf War brought TMD to the attention of the US Congress. Pressure began building in the 
United States to either loosen or completely divest United States antiballistic missile technology 
from the constraints of the ABM Treaty. On 5 December 1991 passed the Missile Defence Act of 
1991.121 This act put Congress on record as officially supporting a National Missile Defence 
(NMD) program, stating that: ‘It is a goal of the United States to deploy an anti-ballistic missile 
system, including one or an adequate additional number of anti-ballistic missile sites and space-
based sensors, that is capable of providing a highly effective defence of the United States against 
limited attacks of ballistic missiles.’122  
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Four years later, a bill was introduced in the United States Congress entitled the Defend 
America Act of 1995,123 which would require the President within 180 days after enactment to 
serve notice that the United States intends to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. This legislation 
(which later failed) was directed toward remedying the lack of defence against ballistic missile 
attack. Section 4 provided within one year after enactment for at least one test of either an ABM 
interceptor based in space; a sensor in space capable of providing data directly to an ABM 
interceptor; or an existing air defence, theatre missile defence, or early warning system to 
demonstrate its capability to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight 
trajectory. In the same year, the Ballistic Missile Defense Act of was proposed.124 The Bill 
approached ballistic missile defences by repealing the Missile Defense Act of 1991.125 It then 
substantially reformulated the initial statement of United States policy on NMD. The proposed 
system included space-based sensors, including the Space and Missile Tracking System (formerly 
known as Brilliant Eyes), and other space-based sensors which could provide cueing to the 
ground-based interceptors.126 The Bill also called for the NMD system to be developed for 
deployment, with an initial operational capability being achieved by 2003.127 On 3 January 1996, 
President Clinton vetoed the Bill owing to the fact that the proposed NMD would not be 
accommodated within the existing ABM Treaty.128 This however wasn’t an outright veto on the 
program itself.129 In 2001, Bill Clinton was replaced by George Bush Jr. Shortly into his first 
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term, on 14 December 2001 Bush dropped a bombshell when he announced the withdrawal of the 
United States’ from the ABM Treaty.130 Among the key reasons he gave was that the Treaty was 
outdated and with the Cold War over, the United States had a new set of defence priorities.131 The 
most significant and alarming consequence of the withdrawal in the author’s view is that it gives 
the United States a free run to develop weapon systems and in particular space based sensors and 
interceptors prohibited under the ABM Treaty, and thus creates yet another significant loophole 
in the space legal framework owing to the dual use technology to which ABM missiles can be 
adapted to. 
 
VI. WRESTLING FOR SPACE SUPERIORITY (A NEW COLD WAR?): MUCH TO BE 
GAINED, LITTLE TO BE LOST—THE BATTLE OF THE TITANS 
In the 21st Century, the United States is preparing its next military objective—a doctrine 
to establish ‘space superiority’.132 Noting the experience of Iraqi Freedom in 2003 in which Iraqi 
deployed GPS jammers the United States is wary that adversaries will target its space capabilities 
in an attempt to deny that combat advantage. Space superiority ensures the freedom to operate in 
the space medium while denying the same to an adversary and, like air superiority, cannot be 
taken for granted.133 The new doctrine means that pre–emptive strikes against enemy satellites 
would become ‘crucial steps in any military operation’.134 The USAF believes that seizing 
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control of the ‘final frontier’ is essential for modern warfare, noting that ‘[s]pace superiority 
provides freedom to attack as well as freedom from attack. Space and air superiority is now 
deemed crucial in any military operation’.135 In this regard the concept of counter space 
operations has been articulated premised on the notion of destroying enemy satellites in the event 
of combat to improve the chance of victory.136  
Space superiority will be gained and maintained through counter space operations which 
is anchored in The US Air Force’s air and space power functions. The development of offensive 
counter space capabilities provides combatant commanders with new tools for counter space 
operations. Counter space operations have defensive and offensive elements, both of which 
depend on robust space situation awareness. These operations may be utilised throughout the 
spectrum of conflict and may achieve a variety of effects from temporary denial to complete 
destruction of the adversary’s space capability.137 With China ascendant in the 21st century space-
technology rivalry between the United States and China is heating up. In 2000 China’s unveiled 
an ambitious ten-year space program whose objectives include:  
 
? To build up an integrated Chinese military and civilian earth observation system.  
? To set up an independently operated indigenously-built satellite broadcasting and 
telecommunications system. The technology would be used to develop new military and civilian 
communications satellites to form a command-and-control network designed to link Chinese 
combat forces. 
? To establish an independent Chinese satellite navigation and positioning system. This would be 
achieved by launching a satellite constellation in stages while developing the relevant application 
systems.138  
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While one of the strongest immediate motivations for this program appears to be political 
prestige, China’s space efforts almost certainly will contribute to improved military space 
systems.139 In 2003, Huang Chunping, commander of the Long March 2-F carrier rocket team 
and deputy commander of the Jiuquan space launch centre noted: ‘Just imagine there are outer 
space facilities of another country at the place very, very high above your head, and so others 
clearly see what you are doing, and what you are feeling…That’s why we also need to develop 
space technology.’140 Like the United States, China is researching technology designed to disable 
or destroy satellites, and is developing a dual-use satellite launch vehicle that is capable of 
‘blinding’ or destroying satellites in orbit as well as technology that can be used in areas such as 
missile guidance systems.141  
In 2003 the Chinese People’s Daily quoted a Chinese military strategist as saying. ‘In the 
current and future state security strategy, if one wants not to be controlled by others, one must 
have considerable space scientific and technological strength.’142 Later, a Chinese military 
official commented that China’s army had already introduced the concept of ‘space force 
strength’143 in apparent reference to a similar US military concept (noted above in this Part of the 
Article). The official went on to note that a Chinese military research report proposed building a 
separate ‘force to fight in space’.  
China is rising peacefully at the moment but nationalism is an important force, and there 
are serious grievances regarding external issues, notably Taiwan. There are inevitable frictions 
with the United States as China’s regional role increases and its ‘sphere of influence’ develops. It 
                                                 
139 Leonard David, Pentagon Report: China’s Space Warfare Tactics Aimed at U.S. Supremacy (2003) Space.com 
<http://www.space.com/news/china_dod_030801.html> at 28 March 2006. 
140 Bill Smith, ‘Space War 2017: Science Fiction or Real Risk?’, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 14 October 2003, 
available at <http://www.ummah.net/forum/showthread.php?t=24910> at 5 May 2006. 
141 David, above n 139. 
142 China looking at ‘space force’ (2003) News24.com <www.news24.com/News24/Technology/News/0,,2-13-
1443_1433115,00.html> at 10 May 2006.
143 Ibid.
 32
is likely that China is inching towards adopting the United States stance—underwriting its 
regional pre-eminence with military might.144 Professor John J Mearsheimer observes that to 
predict the future in Asia, one needs to note how rising powers are likely to act and how other 
states will react to them. In a crisp, incisive analysis he postulates: 
 
The international system has several defining characteristics. The main actors are states that operate in 
anarchy—which simply means that there is no higher authority above them. All great powers have some 
offensive military capability, which means that they can hurt each other. Finally, no state can know the 
future intentions of other states with certainty. The best way to survive in such a system is to be as 
powerful as possible, relative to potential rivals. The mightier a state is, the less likely it is that another 
state will attack it.145
  
China’s intent seems to be to eclipse any peer competitor in Asia and thus dominate Asia 
the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere. In another robust insight, 
Mearsheimer notes ‘…China will strive to maximize the power gap between itself and its 
neighbors, especially Japan and Russia, and to ensure that no state in Asia can threaten it.’146 This 
path has lots of rewards to offer not least that gaining regional hegemony is probably the only 
way that China will get back Taiwan. However, American policymakers are unlikely to sit on 
their hands and watch this unfold, and in all likelihood as the world’s sole superpower will seek 
to contain China much in the same way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.  
At present, the United States is spending more on Missile Defense than on conventional 
counterforce and related capabilities dedicated to attacking theatre missiles on the ground before 
they are launched. In part, this allocation of resources reflects the abundance of weapons, 
platforms and sensors that can be applied to attacking theatre missiles and launchers, in addition 
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to the full spectrum of other ground targets. Once the United States deploys an effective BMD 
system, minimal deterrent capability posed by other major powers could be negated unless their 
missile arsenals are sufficiently improved in numbers and accuracy, and by fitting its ICBMs 
with Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs)—weapons long at the centre 
of the former US-Soviet Cold War arms race and the subject of key bilateral disarmament treaties 
including the ABM Treaty, SALT I and II and START I and II. This American initiative is 
fuelling a new arms race. Having abrogated the ABM Treaty in 2001, American policy makers 
declared that mounting non-nuclear warheads on intercontinental strategic missiles would give 
the option of striking a target anywhere on Earth within about 30 minutes and with a large 
element of surprise, since there is no reliance on easily detectable ships or aircraft.147 In 2006, the 
Kremlin voiced worry over US plans to mount non-nuclear warheads on intercontinental strategic 
missiles to strike targets anywhere in the world within minutes and with no prior warning and 
called for talks on subject.148 
The American initiatives have raised hackles in China with its military strategists 
developing a concept of limited deterrence.149 Limited deterrence rests on a limited war–fighting 
capability aimed at communicating China’s ability to inflict costly damage on the adversary at 
every rung on the escalation ladder and thus denying the adversary victory in the event of a war. 
Limited deterrence requires hitting counterforce targets that are mobile. These forces would thus 
require effective space–based early warning, and some configuration of Ballistic Missile Defence 
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capabilities. Given that China does not now have such capabilities, the straight–line prediction 
would be that over the next decade or so, we should expect to see a discernible effort to shift the 
forces away from a minimum strike–back assured destruction posture, which China now has, 
toward limited war–fighting.150  
China has made quantum steps to realise its space dream in a relatively short span of time. 
Sino-Russian space cooperation has strengthened as a cash-strapped Russia increasingly offers 
technological expertise to a cashed up China. This is likely to continue in the coming years as 
China moves toward lunar and deep space explorations and the next phases of manned space 
program. On the other hand, Sino-U.S. space cooperation has not been overly amicable. Though 
in 1995, the two countries signed a commercial space launch agreement whereby the U.S. 
government would grant export licenses for American-made satellites to be launched on Chinese 
rockets, Washington remained concerned over Chinese access to space technologies with military 
applications that could improve its missile systems. The program was effectively suspended in 
2002 in the wake of the Loral/Hughes investigation and the release of the Cox Report that 
alleged, among other things, that the Chinese were using international space cooperation to 
enhance its military space capabilities.151  
The implementation of the ambitious Chinese space plan creates a situation between the 
United States and China resembling the Cold War. Allegations of Chinese theft of American 
                                                 
150 According to William S Murray III and Robert Antonellis, ‘China’s Space Program: The Dragon Eyes the Moon 
(and Us)’ (2003) 47 Orbis 645, 650: 
 
The PRC’s current nuclear deterrence doctrine emphasizes a Chinese retaliatory strike against countervalue 
targets (enemy cities) rather than against counterforce targets (enemy missiles that could threaten China). This 
is because counterforce targeting requires the use of highly accurate ballistic missiles, preferably with 
multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs)—two technologies that China currently lacks in 
its operational ICBMs. 
 
151 James H Hughes, ‘The Current Status of China’s Military Space Program’ (2002) 47 The Journal of Social, 
Political and Economic Studies 403–404. 
 35
technology through espionage, security crackdowns and spy hunts are strongly reminiscent of the 
early 1950’s.152 This seems to bear the hallmarks of a new Cold War in the making pegged on a 
second space race. The 21st century may well be the ‘Chinese Century’, in which China becomes 
the richest, most populous, and most powerful nation on Earth.’153 As America strides along in 
the new millennium and a new space race is in the offing, this time, the challenger to the 
American super-power is China. Could another Cold War be afoot? 
China’s manned space and associate programs will no doubt enable the country to 
develop and improve its military applications, including space-based intelligence gathering, 
navigation, and guidance, and jamming. Chinese military space programs are driven by security 
considerations. ‘… Western analysts point to the fact that the Chinese manned space program has 
always been under the command of the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] General Armament 
Director—Gen. Cao Gangchuan for Shenzhou V and Gen. Chen Bingde for Shenzhou VI. Many 
of the programs carried out through the Shenzhou series are suspected of having dual-use 
significance, such as the high-resolution imaging system and reconnaissance capabilities.’154 In 
2005 a United States Defence Department report on the Chinese military voiced concerns over 
China’s space program, pointing out that military capability and strategy ‘is likely one of the 
primary drivers behind Beijing’s space endeavours and a critical component’ of the country’s 
financial investment in space.155. 
In October 2005, during his first-ever visit to China as United States Defence Secretary, 
Donald Rumsfeld spent most of his time berating the top brass of the PLA on the excessive 
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ambition and lack of transparency in regard to Chinese military modernisation program.156 In 
November of the same year, when United States President Bush Jr. visited China, no 
breakthroughs were achieved from the much-anticipated summit between Presidents Bush Jr. and 
his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao raising doubts as to whether the two ‘strategic competitors’ can 
put their common interests ahead of deep-seated differences. In the meantime, Chinese strategic 
and military advisers are warily watching new deployments of United States troops and military 
installations in Japan following discussions between defence officials from both sides on how to 
extend the reach of the U.S.-Japan military alliance in Asia.157
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Space Law regime has a schizophrenic quality which exposes a serious internal 
contradiction in the Space Law regime. As space technology develops into more sophisticated 
areas such as low–earth systems, space planes, and a variety of space–based platforms carrying a 
variety of systems, the issue of delimiting the outer space area district from national airspace 
should become more immediate. The ‘peaceful’ purposes centrepiece of Space Law does not rule 
out the military use of outer space or military use of commercial communications satellites. It 
does not prohibit the use of commercial satellite communications in tactical military operations in 
which armed force is used. Whether a military use is for ‘peaceful purposes’ cannot be 
determined by the type of vehicle on which a satellite terminal is mounted, by the vehicle’s 
cargo, by the nature of the communications traffic, or by whether the vehicle or personnel using 
the equipment are engaged in military operations involving the use of armed force. Satellite earth 
stations need not be ‘turned–off’ merely because the vehicle on which they are mounted are 
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engaged in an operation involving the use of armed force. The Space Law regime yields little 
information on space warfare.  
Several decades after man’s conquest of space, there has not yet been a case of one nation 
using force against another in outer space. Nonetheless, given the increasing global reliance on 
space systems, and increasing militarization of space, its weaponization and evolution into a 
distinct theatre of military operations seems likely. According to one observer, ‘two of every 
three launchings of spacecraft serve military purposes’.158 As space technology develops into 
more sophisticated areas such as low-earth systems, space planes, and a variety of space-based 
platforms carrying a variety of systems, the issue of definitively interpreting ‘peaceful purposes’ 
assumes urgency. It is difficult to reconcile the objective of ‘development of weapons systems’ 
and ‘military operations’ with the goal of using space for ‘peaceful purposes for the benefit of all 
mankind’.  
In the face of rising Chinese Space breakthroughs and accelerating American space 
weaponization, it may not be possible to have these two titans agree to a bilateral treaty in the 
face of the obvious military utility offered by space. Absent a comprehensive, multilateral 
agreement preserving space for peaceful purposes, space remains open to military development. 
It is to be remembered that in August 1981, the Soviet Union submitted to the United Nations 
Committee on Disarmament a Draft Treaty on the Stationing of Weapons of any Kind in Outer 
Space.159 The draft treaty sought to ban deployment of all types of weapons in outer space and to 
provide for the use of national technical monitoring facilities. Its revival would provide a focal 
point for states to negotiate a comprehensive multilateral treaty to address the weaponization of 
outer space considering that the United States withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and its policy to 
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contain China as a peer competitor all but rules out a bilateral treaty between the two titans. In 
any case China is unlikely to agree to a treaty that constrains its rapidly budding space program, 
but preserves the technological edge that the United States already enjoys.  
 39
